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Abstract—We consider the problem of privacy-preserving data
release for a specific utility task under perfect obfuscation
constraint. We establish the necessary and sufficient condition
to extract features of the original data that carry as much
information about a utility attribute as possible, while not
revealing any information about the sensitive attribute. This
problem formulation generalizes both the information bottleneck
and privacy funnel problems. We adopt a local information
geometry analysis that provides useful insight into information
coupling and trajectory construction of spherical perturbation of
probability mass functions. This analysis allows us to construct
the modal decomposition of the joint distributions, divergence
transfer matrices, and mutual information. By decomposing the
mutual information into orthogonal modes, we obtain the locally
sufficient statistics for inferences about the utility attribute,
while satisfying perfect obfuscation constraint. Furthermore, we
develop the notion of perfect obfuscation based on χ2-divergence
and Kullback–Leibler divergence in the Euclidean information
space.
I. INTRODUCTION
Releasing an optimal representation of data for a given
task while simultaneously assuring privacy of the individuals’
identity and their associated data is one of the main challenges
in the information-theory, signal processing, data mining and
machine learning communities. An optimal representation
is the most useful (sufficient), compressed (compact), and
privacy-breaching (minimal) of data. Indeed, the optimal rep-
resentation of data can be obtained subject to constraints on
the target task and its computational and storage complexities.
We investigate the problem of privacy-preserving data re-
lease for a specific utility task and consider an obfuscation-
utility trade-off model where both utility and obfuscation are
measured under logarithmic loss. Consider two communica-
tion parties, a data owner and a utility service provider. The
data owner observes a random variable X and acquires some
utility, from the service provider, based on the information
he discloses. Simultaneously, the data owner wishes to limit
the amount of information revealed about a sensitive random
variable S that it depends on X . Therefore, instead of revealing
X directly to the service provider, the data owner releases a
new representation, denoted by Z. The amount of information
leaked to the service provider is measured by I (S;Z). In
particular, the data owner is subjected to a constraint on
the information complexity of representation that can be
revealed to the service provider. This imposed information
complexity is measured by I (X;Z). Moreover, in general,
the utility acquired depends on a utility random variable U
that is dependent on X and may be correlated to S. The
amount of useful information revealed to the service provider
is measured by I (U ;Z). Therefore, considering Markov chain
(U ,S)−◦−X−◦−Z, our aim is to share a sanitized represen-
tation Z of observed data X , through a stochastic mapping
PZ|X , while preserving information about utility attribute U
and obfuscate information about sensitive attribute S. We
called the stochastic mapping PZ|X the complexity-constraint
obfuscation-utility-assuring mapping.
Information theoretic (IT) privacy approaches [1]–[25],
model and analyze privacy-utility trade-offs using the IT
metrics to provide asymptomatic or non-asymptotic privacy-
utility-guaranteed frameworks. Inspired from [2], in the most
general form, the IT frameworks is based on the knowledge
of specific ‘private’ variable (or data, attribute, information)
and correlated non-private variable, and assumption of exact
joint distribution or partial statistical knowledge of private
and/or non-private data. In this setup, the goal is to design
a privacy assuring mapping that transforms the pair of these
variables into a new representation that achieves a specific
application-based target utility, while simultaneously minimiz-
ing the information inferred about the private variable. In
many applications, the data X is characterized over large
(finite) alphabets while the attribute of interest, i.e., U , is
characterized over small (finite) alphabets which results in
I (U ;X)≤H(U)H(X).
Focusing on the finite alphabets and considering local infor-
mation geometry analysis, we develop the notion of perfect ob-
fuscation based on χ2-divergence and Kullback–Leibler (KL)
divergence in the Euclidean information space. Under this
analysis, we establish the necessary and sufficient condition to
obtain representation Z of the original data X that maximizes
the mutual information between utility attribute U and released
representation Z, while simultaneously revealing no infor-
mation about sensitive attribute S. We decompose statistical
dependence between random variables U , S, X and Z by
decomposing the corresponding mutual informations I (X;Z),
I (U ;Z), and I (S;Z) into orthogonal modes. This model can
be viewed as a generalization of two well-known bottleneck
models, i.e., Information Bottleneck (IB) and Privacy Funnel
(PF).
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Throughout this paper, random variables are denoted by cap-
ital letters (e.g. X), deterministic values are denoted by small
letters (e.g. x), alphabets (sets) are denoted by Calligraphic
fonts (e.g. X ). Superscript (.)T stands for the transpose. For
discrete random variable X , let consider a finite support set
X , {1, ..., |X |} with 2 ≤ |X | < +∞. We denote by P (X )
the set of all possible probability distributions of a random
variable X with range X . We denote by pX the probability
mass function (pmf) vector with i-th entry equal to pX(i).
H(pX) := EpX [− logpX ] denotes Shannon entropy. The rel-
ative entropy is defined as DKL (pX‖qX) := EpX
[
log pXqX
]
.
II. PERFECT INFORMATION OBFUSCATION MODEL
Given the observed data X the defender (data owner) wishes
to release a representation Z for a utility task U while keeping
another attribute S as sensitive. Let us assume that pU ,S,X
is fixed and known by both defender and adversary, and
(U ,S)−◦−X−◦−Z. We consider the non-interactive, one-shot
regime, where the data owner discloses the representation Z
once, and no additional information is released. The general
objective is to obtain stochastic map PZ|X : X → Z such
that pU |Z=z ≈ pU |X ,∀z ∈ Z,∀U ∈ U ,∀X ∈ X , while
pS|Z=z ≈ pS ,∀z ∈Z,∀S ∈S . This means that the posterior
distribution of the utility attribute U are similar given the
released representation Z and original data X , while the pos-
terior distribution of the sensitive attribute S are independent
of the released representation Z. One can raises a question
whether it is feasible that the defender releases a representation
Z such that I (S;Z) = EpZ
[
DKL
(
pS|Z‖pS
)]
= 0, i.e.,
S ⊥ Z, while I (U ;Z) > 0, i.e., U 6⊥ Z. This is a
fundamental problem in information-theoretic privacy which
is known as data disclosure under perfect privacy regime. We
will refer to this notion as perfect information obfuscation.
To pave our way, let us shortly review the previous models
which are specific cases of our model. Consider the Markov
chain U−◦−X−◦−Z. This gives us the celebrated Information
Bottleneck (IB) problem [26], where I (U ;Z) is referred to as
the useful released information (relevance of U ) and I (X;Z)
is referred to as the information complexity (description
length). The goal of IB model is to find a representation Z
of X such that Z is maximally informative about U while
being minimally informative about X . We now consider the
Markov chain S−◦−X−◦−Z. This gives us the well known
Privacy Funnel (PF) problem [8], where I (S;Z) is referred to
as the disclosed sensitive information, and I (X;Z) is referred
to as the useful information. The goal of PF model is to
obtain a representation Z of X that minimizes information
between sensitive data S and disclosed representation Z while
maximizes the amount of information between non-private
(useful) data X and disclosed representation Z.
Considering the PF model, the optimal obfuscation-utility
coefficient for a given distribution pS,X is defined as [10]:
ν∗ (pS,X) := infpZ|X :
S−◦−X−◦−Z
I (S;Z)
I (X;Z)
. (1)
They showed that ν∗ (pS,X) is related to the smallest principal
component of pS,X , and obtained the necessary and sufficient
conditions under which ν∗ (pS,X) = 0. In [17], they studied
a similar problem, however, they formulated the objective
as of utility maximization under privacy leakage constraint.
Hence, the optimal obfuscation-utility coefficient for a given
distribution pS,X is defined as:
gγ(pS,X) = sup
pZ|X :
S−◦−X−◦−Z
I(S;Z)≤γ
I (X;Z) , (2)
where perfect information obfuscation is said to be feasible if
g0(pS,X)>0.
We consider the Markov model (U ,S)−◦−X−◦−Z which
subsumes both IB and PF objectives. In this case, the func-
tional (2) can be generalized as:
gγ(pU ,S,X) = sup
pZ|X :
(U ,S)−◦−X−◦−Z
I(X;Z)≤R
I(S;Z)≤γ
I (U ;Z) . (3)
In particular, we study the necessary and sufficient conditions
under which g0(pU ,S,X) > 0 under local information geome-
try analysis. To this goal, let us define the non-trivial perfect
information obfuscation as follows.
Definition 1 (Non-trivial Perfect Information Obfuscation).
For a pair of random variables (U ,S,X), we say that non-
trivial perfect information obfuscation is feasible if there exists
a random variable Z, that satisfies the following conditions:
1) (U ,S)−◦−X−◦−Z forms a Markov chain.
2) S and Z are independent, i.e., S ⊥ Z.
3) U and Z are not independent, i.e., U 6⊥ Z.
Note that this definition subsumes the notion of perfect
privacy addressed in [17] as well as the notion of weakly
independent introduced in [27].
We assume that we observe data X and the distribution pX
is fixed. Hence, our purpose in non-trivial perfect information
obfuscation problem is to construct a trajectory of perturbed
pmfs such that a change along that direction changes pU , while
keeps pS unchanged. We establish the necessary and sufficient
condition for the existence of I (U ;Z) > 0, under a perfect
obfuscation regime.
Lemma 1. Without loss of optimality we can restrict the size
of Z in (3) to |Z| ≤ |X |+ 2.
Proof. The proof is based on Fenchel–Eggleston strengthening
of Carathéodory’s Theorem [28].
III. LOCAL INFORMATION GEOMETRY ANALYSIS
To get insight into the trajectory construction, we adopt the
local information geometry analysis [29]–[33] that provides
geometrically appealing interpretation. Consider any reference
pmf pX ∈ P◦ (X ) in the relative interior of the probability
simplex in R|X |, where P◦ (X ) , {pX ∈ P (X ) : pX(x) >
0,∀x ∈ X} denotes the relative interior of P (X ). Consider a
perturbed pmf r()X = pX+ hX ∈ P (X ) from pX , for some
small1 value , where hX is an additive perturbation vector of
dimension |X |, satisfying ∑x hX(x) = 0. The second order
Taylor expansion of KL divergence can be written as:
DKL
(
pX‖ r()X
)
= −
∑
x
pX(x) log
r
()
X (x)
pX(x)
(4a)
= −
∑
x
pX(x) log
(
1 + 
hX(x)
pX(x)
)
(4b)
=
1
2
2
∑
x
1
pX(x)
h2X(x) + o
(
2
)
(4c)
= Dχ2
(
pX‖ r()X
)
+ o
(
2
)
. (4d)
where o
(
2
)
denotes the Bachmann-Landau asymptotic little-o
notation2, and DX 2
(
pX‖ r()X
)
denotes χ2-divergence between
pX and r
()
X , defined as follows:
Dχ2
(
pX‖ r()X
)
,
∑
x∈X
(
pX(x)− r()X (x)
)2
pX(x)
. (5)
Considering (4c), one can view
∑
x h
2
X(x)/pX(x) as a
weighted norm square of the perturbation vector hX , i.e., KL
divergence is locally a weighted Euclidean metric3. Note that,
in general, DKL
(
pX‖ r()X
) 6= DKL(r()X ‖pX), however, these
divergences are equal up to the first order approximations, i.e.,
they are locally symmetric. Since by replacing the weights
pX(x) in this norm by any other distribution in the neighbor-
hood, the first order approximation remains the same. There-
fore, we have DKL
(
pX‖ r()X
)
= DKL
(
r
()
X ‖pX
)
+o
(
2
)
. This
means that they resemble the standard Euclidean metric within
a local neighborhood of pmfs around a reference pmf (i.e.,
from the center of the local neighborhood) in P◦(X ).
We now go one step further and instead of additive
perturbation r()X = pX +  hX , define the spherical
perturbations for our analysis. Consider any reference pmf
pX ∈ P◦(X ), and any other pmf rX ∈ P (X ). We can
define the spherical perturbation vector of rX from pX as
kX , (rX − pX) diag
(√
pX
)−1
, where
√
pX denotes the
entry-wise square root of pX , and diag
(√
pX
)
denotes a
diagonal matrix with principal entries equal to
√
pX . Now,
we can construct a trajectory of spherically perturbation pmfs
as follows:
r
()
X = pX +  kX diag(
√
pX) (6a)
= (1− )pX +  rX , (6b)
where  ∈ (0, 1) controls closeness of r()X and pX . The
second equation expresses r()X as a convex combination of
pX and rX . Note that kX in (6a) is a normalized pertur-
bation vector and provides the direction of our trajectory.
Furthermore, considering the constraint
∑
x hX(x) = 0 we
1We assume that  6= 0 is small enough such that r()X is a valid pmf. Note
that for larger values of  it may not be entry-wise non-negative.
2lim→0 o
(
2
)
/2 = 0
3Note that all the well-defined f -divergences are locally equivalent to χ2-
divergence measure to within a constant scale factor. Moreover, note that they
locally behave like a Fisher information metric on the statistical manifold.
can verify that kX in (6a) satisfies the orthogonality constraint
(C1) : kTX
√
pX = 0. Finally, we can rewrite the quadratic
approximation of KL divergence as a scaled Euclidean norm
of kX . We have:
DKL
(
pX‖ r()X
)
=
1
2
2 ‖kX‖22 + o
(
2
)
. (7)
Note that using this local approximation we can construct inner
products as well as orthogonal perturbations and projections
in the Euclidean space.
Remark 1. In [27], the authors defined the notion of weakly
independence for a pair of random variables (S,X) ∈ S ×X
(|S|, |X | <∞) as existence of a random variable Z such that:
(i) S−◦−X−◦−Z forms a Markov chain, (ii) S and Z are
independent, and (iii) X and Z are not independent. They
showed that such a random variable Z exists if and only
if the columns of PS|X are linearly dependent. Inspired by
this notion of weakly independent, the authors in [17], [24]
carefully studied and analyzed perfect obfuscation problem
where the goal is to release the useful information X while
keeping S as private. Here we extend both, and establish the
notion of weakly dependence based on KL-divergence and
χ2-divergence.
Using the local information approximation, we can write
the conditional distributions pX|Z=z as perturbation of pX ,
i.e., we have:
pX|Z=z = pX +  kX|z diag(
√
pX) . (8)
We just need to ensure that pX|Z=z , for different val-
ues z, be a valid probability distribution and satisfy the
marginal constraints. Hence, we additionally required (C2) :∑
z pZ(z) kX|z(x)
√
pX(x) = 0,∀x ∈ X which guarantees
that marginal pmf of X is preserved, i.e.,
∑
z pZ(z)pX|Z=z =
pX . Therefore, our purpose in non-trivial perfect obfuscation
problem under local information geometry analysis is to design
the latent distribution pZ and the conditional distributions
pX|Z=z , for different values of z, such that: (i) the constraints
(C1) and (C2) are satisfied, (ii) S ⊥ Z, and (iii) U 6⊥ Z.
Proposition 1. For perfect obfuscation data released model
(U ,S)−◦−X−◦−Z under local information geometry analy-
sis, the non-trivial perfect obfuscation is feasible if and only
if for all z ∈ Z we simultaneously have:
WS kX|z diag(
√
pX) = 0, (9a)
WU kX|z diag(
√
pX) 6= 0, (9b)
where WS := PS|X : X → S and WU := PU |X : X → U
are fixed probability transition kernels, with dimension |S| ×
|X | and |U| × |X |, respectively.
Proof. To ensure perfect obfuscation, we need pS|Z=z =
pS ,∀S ∈ S, z ∈ Z . Considering the Markov chain
S−◦−X−◦−Z, we have:
pS|Z=z = WS pX|Z=z =WS pX + WS hX|z
= pS + WS kX|z diag(
√
pX) , ∀z ∈ Z. (10)
Therefore, S ⊥ Z, if and only if WS kX|z diag
(√
pX
)
=
0,∀z ∈ Z . Analogously, considering the Markov chain
U−◦−X−◦−Z, we have:
pU |Z=z = WU pX|Z=z =WU pX + WU hX|z
= pU + WU kX|z diag(
√
pX) , ∀z ∈ Z. (11)
Hence, if we can find the perturbation direction such that
WS kX|z diag
(√
pX
)
= 0 and WU kX|z diag
(√
pX
) 6= 0,
for some z ∈ Z , the non-trivial solution, i.e., I (U ;Z) > 0,
is possible. Conversely, we have a non-trivial solution only
if there exists a random variable Z and a valid perturbation
vector kX|z such that a change along that direction changes
pU , while keeping pS unchanged. This implies (9).
Definition 2 (Divergence Transfer Matrix). Given the random
variables X ∈ X and Z ∈ Z with joint pmf PX,Z ∈
P (X × Z), with conditional pmfs PX|Z ∈ P (X | Z) and
marginal pmfs satisfying pX ∈ P◦ (X ) and pZ ∈ P◦ (X ), the
divergence transfer matrix associated with PX,Z is defined as
follows:
BX,Z= B (PX,Z), diag(
√
pX)
−1
PX,Z diag(
√
pZ)
−1
= diag(
√
pX)
−1
PX|Z diag(
√
pZ). (12)
Note that based on the above definition BTX,Z =
diag
(√
pZ
)−1
PZ|X diag
(√
pX
)
. We now express the Sin-
gular Value decomposition (SVD) of BX,Z as:
BX,Z =
K∑
i=1
σXZi ψ
Z
i (ψ
Z
i )
T
, (13)
where K := min {|X |, |Z|}, σXZi denotes the i-th singular
value, and where ψZi and ψ
X
i are the corresponding left
(output) and right (input) singular vectors. By convention,
suppose that σXZ1 ≥ σXZ2 ≥ · · · ≥ σXZK . Likewise consider
SVD of BU ,X , BS,X , BU ,Z and BS,Z .
Proposition 2 (Local Approximation of Information Mea-
sures). Under the local approximation conditions, the infor-
mation complexity I (X;Z), utility information I (U ;Z), and
information leakage I (S;Z) can recast as:
I (X;Z) =
1
2
2
∑
z∈Z
pZ(z) ‖kX|z ‖22 + o
(
2
)
(14a)
=
1
2
(
‖BX,Z‖2F − 1
)
+ o
(
2
)
, (14b)
I (U ;Z) =
1
2
2
∑
z∈Z
pZ(z) ‖BU ,X kX|z‖22 + o
(
2
)
(14c)
=
1
2
(
‖BU ,Z‖2F − 1
)
+ o
(
2
)
, (14d)
I (S;Z) =
1
2
2
∑
z∈Z
pZ(z) ‖BS,X kX|z‖22 + o
(
2
)
(14e)
=
1
2
(
‖BS,Z‖2F − 1
)
+ o
(
2
)
, (14f)
where BU ,X and BU ,Z are defined analogous to (12).
Proof. See Appendix A.
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Fig. 1: The information geometry associated with the diver-
gence transfer matrix BX,Z . Visualization for second, third
and forth singular vectors, ignoring the first invalid direction.
BX,Z maps a local divergence sphere in P(X ) to a local
divergence ellipsoid in P(Z).
The local approximation (14) gives a nice geometric in-
terpretation. Consider a local divergence sphere in P (X )
constructed as (8). The divergence transfer matrix BX,Z maps
a local divergence sphere in P (X ) to a local divergence
ellipsoid in P (Z) (Fig. 1). Noting that the Markov chain
U−◦−X−◦−Z implies:
pU (u) =
∑
x∈X
pU |X(u |x) pX(x), (15a)
pU |Z(u |z) =
∑
x∈X
pU |X(u |x) pX|Z(x |z). (15b)
Analogously, consider the likewise relation for pS(s) and
pS|Z(s | z). Therefore, the information perturbation vector
kX|z maps to the associated information perturbation vectors
kU |z , BU ,XkX|z and kS|z , BS,XkX|z . In other words,
the local geometry of pX|Z in the simplex P (X ) induces a
corresponding local geometry for pU |Z and pS|Z .
Under the local information approximation (14) and satisfy-
ing the constraints (C1) and (C2) of perturbation construction,
and neglecting o
(
2
)
terms, the optimization problem under
perfect obfuscation constraint can recast as:
max
pZ ,pX|Z
∑
z∈Z
pZ(z) ‖BU ,X kX|z‖22 (16a)
s.t.
∑
z∈Z
pZ(z) ‖kX|z‖22 ≤ R′, (16b)∑
z∈Z
pZ(z) ‖BS,X kX|z‖22 = 0, (16c)
or equivalently, as:
max
pZ ,pX|Z
‖BU ,Z‖2F s.t. ‖BX,Z‖2F ≤ R′′, ‖BS,Z‖2F = 1,
(17)
where R′ = 2R/2 and R′′ = 2R + 1. Note that the pmf
pZ does not affect the optimization and can be removed from
(16). Hence SVD solves the optimization problem (16) by
finding pX|Z . Finally, note that by construction I (X;Z) ≤
1
2
2. Hence, as long as R ≤ 122, we can relax the associated
constraint in local information geometry analysis.
To get insight of the optimization problem (16), let us
ignore the constraints (16b) and (16c). Note that based on the
constraint (C1) the valid normalized perturbation kX|z must
be orthogonal to
√
pX , hence
√
pX (the right singular vector
of BU ,X corresponding to the largest singular value) is an
invalid direction to perturb pmf. Letting σUX2 be the second
largest singular value of BU ,X , we have ‖BU ,X kX|z‖2 ≤
(σUX2 )
2 ‖kX|z‖2. Therefore, under this assumption, the opti-
mal solution to (16a) is to choose the perturbation kX|z to be
along the right singular vector of BU ,X corresponding to the
second largest singular value. Note that all the unit norm right
singular vectors of BU ,X which are orthogonal to
√
pX are a
valid perturbation. This means that any linear combination of
these singular vectors also valid candidates for {kX|z, z ∈ Z}.
Let Range (BU ,X) = {BU ,X kX|z | kX|z ∈ R|X |} ⊆ R|U|
denotes the range-space of BU ,X , and Null (BS,X) = {kX|z |
BS,XkX|z = 0} ⊆ R|X | denotes the null-space of BS,X . We
now have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. For perfect obfuscation data released model
(U,S)−◦−X−◦−Z under local information geometry analysis,
the non-trivial perfect information obfuscation is feasible if
and only if:
dim (Range (BU ,X) ∩ Null (BS,X) ) > 0. (18)
Proof. The proof follows by using Proposition 1 and noting
that Divergence Transfer Matrix BU ,X (likewise BS,X ) is an
equivalent representation for PU ,X (likewise PS,X ) and, in
turn, PU |X (likewise PS|X ).
We now relate the solutions of (16) to locally sufficient
statistics for inferences about utility attribute U based on Z.
Let us consider an arbitrary embedding (feature) f : X → R
and let g : Z → R be the embedding (feature) induced by f
through conditional expectation with respect to pX|Z=z . We
have:
g(z) = E [f(X) | Z = z] , z ∈ Z. (19)
We can recast (19) as:
g(z) =
1
pZ(z)
∑
x∈X
pX,Z(x, z)f(x)
=
1√
pZ(z)
∑
x∈X
BX,Z(x, z)
√
pX(x)f(x), (20)
where BX,Z(x, z)=
pX,Z(x,z)√
pX(x)
√
pZ(z)
,∀x∈X , z∈Z is the (x, z)-
th entry of BX,Z . We now define ξX(x) :=
√
pX(x)f(x) and
ξZ(z) :=
√
pZ(z)g(z), ∀x ∈ X , z ∈ Z . Then we can express
(20) as:
ξZ(z) =
∑
x∈X
BX,Z(x, z) ξ
X(x). (21)
The vectors ξX and ξZ whose x-th and z-th entries are
ξX(x),∀x ∈ X and ξZ(z),∀z ∈ Z , respectively, can be
referred as feature vectors associated with the feature functions
f and g.
According to (13) and proof of proposition 2, we have
BX,Z(x, z) =
∑K
i=1 σ
XZ
i ψ
X
i (x)ψ
Z
i (z) =
√
pX(x)
√
pZ(z)+∑K
i=2 σ
XZ
i ψ
X
i (x)ψ
Z
i (z). We now define features f
∗
i : X → R
and g∗i : X → R, for i = 2, 3, ...,K, as follows:
f∗i (x) :=
ψXi (x)√
pX(x)
, (22a)
g∗i (z) :=
ψZi (z)√
pZ(z)
. (22b)
Hence we have:
BX,Z(x, z) =
√
pX(x)
√
pZ(z)
(
1 +
K∑
i=2
σXZi f
∗
i (x)g
∗
i (z)
)
.
(23)
Noting that PX,Z(x, z) = BX,Z(x, z)
√
pX(x)
√
pZ(z) =
pX(x)pZ(z)
(
1 +
∑K
i=2 σ
XZ
i f
∗
i (x)g
∗
i (z)
)
, we have modal
decomposition of joint distributions, conditional distribu-
tions, and mutual information in terms of feature functions
(f∗i , g
∗
i ) , i = 2, 3, ...,K. Hence, the valid perturbation direc-
tions in optimization problem (16) give us the corresponding
valid feature functions, as well as, associated locally normal-
ized sufficient statistics for inferences about U based on Z,
under perfect obfuscation constraint.
IV. CONCLUSION
Adopting a local information geometry analysis and consid-
ering mutual information as both obfuscation and utility mea-
sure, we studied a data released mechanism for a given utility
task, and under perfect obfuscation constraint. The addressed
model subsumes both the Information Bottleneck model and
the Privacy Funnel model. We studied the notion of perfect
obfuscation based on χ2-divergence and Kullback–Leibler
divergence in the Euclidean information space. Furthermore,
we characterized the necessary and sufficient conditions under
which a non-trivial solution is feasible.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proof.
I (X;Z) =
∑
z
pZ(z)DKL
(
pX|Z=z ‖pX
)
(24a)
=
1
2
2
∑
z∈Z
pZ(z) ‖kX|z‖22 + o
(
2
)
(24b)
=
1
2
2
∑
z,x
pZ(z)
(
pX|Z(x | z)− pX(x)

√
pX(x)
)2
+ o
(
2
)
(24c)
=
1
2
∑
z,x
(
pX,Z(x, z)− pX(x)pZ(z)√
pX(x)
√
pZ(z)
)2
+ o
(
2
)
(24d)
=
1
2
‖BX,Z −√pX√pZT ‖
2
F + o
(
2
)
(24e)
=
1
2
(
‖BX,Z‖2F − 1
)
+ o
(
2
)
, (24f)
I (U ;Z) =
∑
z
pZ(z)DKL
(
pU |Z=z ‖pU
)
(25a)
=
1
2
2
∑
z∈Z
pZ(z)·
‖diag(√pU )−1WUdiag(√pX)kX|z‖
2
2
+ o
(
2
)
(25b)
=
1
2
2
∑
z∈Z
pZ(z) ‖BU ,X kX|z‖22 + o
(
2
)
(25c)
=
1
2
2
∑
z,u
pZ(z)
(
pU |Z(u | z)− pU (u)

√
pU (u)
)2
+ o
(
2
)
(25d)
=
1
2
∑
z,x
(
pX,Z(x, z)− pX(x)pZ(z)√
pX(x)
√
pZ(z)
)2
+ o
(
2
)
(25e)
=
1
2
‖BU ,Z −√pU√pZT ‖
2
F + o
(
2
)
(25f)
=
1
2
(
‖BU ,Z‖2F − 1
)
+ o
(
2
)
. (25g)
The equalities (24f) and (25g) follow by noticing that the
largest singular value of divergence transfer matrices BX,Z
and BU ,Z are 1, i.e., their spectral norm is equal to one.
Note that BX,Z and BU ,Z originate from the column stochas-
tic transition matrices of conditional probabilities PX|Z and
PU |Z , respectively. Therefore, the corresponding right (input)
singular vectors are as follows:
ψX1 = BX,Z
√
pZ = σ
XZ
1
√
pX =
√
pX , (26a)
ψU1 = BU ,Z
√
pZ = σ
UZ
1
√
pU =
√
pU . (26b)
The local approximation of information leakage I (S;Z)
derivation follows similar lines as (25).
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